Potential Liability Arising Out of the Use of Trademarks in Web Site Meta Tags and Ensuring Coverage of Meta Tag Trademark Infringement Claims under Commercial Insurance Policies by Johnson, Jennifer D.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 4 Summer 2001 Article 6 
2001 
Potential Liability Arising Out of the Use of Trademarks in Web 
Site Meta Tags and Ensuring Coverage of Meta Tag Trademark 
Infringement Claims under Commercial Insurance Policies 
Jennifer D. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer D. Johnson, Potential Liability Arising Out of the Use of Trademarks in Web Site Meta Tags and 
Ensuring Coverage of Meta Tag Trademark Infringement Claims under Commercial Insurance Policies, 50 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 1009 (2001). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss4/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
POTENTIAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF
TRADEMARKS IN WEB SITE META TAGS AND
ENSURING COVERAGE OF META TAG TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS UNDER COMMERCIAL
INSURANCE POLICIES
Jennifer D. Johnson'
The Court is mindful of the difficulty of applying well-
established doctrines to what can only be described as an
amorphous situs of information, anonymous messenger of
communication, and seemingly endless stream of
commerce.
The Internet continues to grow each day, changing many aspects of
life, including the way business is conducted.2 The Internet has changed
business through advertising on the World Wide Web,3 and the ability of
businesses to reach many more consumers, much more quickly and
effectively.' One way businesses do this is through the use of meta tags.5
Meta tags are keywords encoded in the background language of a Web
J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
2. See Randy K. Paar, Coverage For Losses Arising Out of Use of the Internet, SE64
ALI-ABA 1095, 1111 (2000) (contending that the use of the Internet will cause an
explosion in intellectual property claims against businesses, and will also change the types
of insurance businesses buy and how they buy it); Robert L. Tucker, Information
Superhighway Robbery: The Tortious Misuse of Links, Frames, Metatags, and Domain
Names, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, *2 (1999), at http:/www.vjolt.net/vol4/v4i2a8-tucker.html
(commenting on the industrial, technical and societal changes caused by the increased use
of the Internet).
3. See Paar, supra note 2, at 1111.
4. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the
Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REv. 835, 835 (2000) (noting that the Internet has evolved from a
"vast library" to a "sprawling mall").
5. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONz. L. REv. 277, 278 (1997) (describing the
use of meta tags as a way for businesses to inform Internet users that their site exists).
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site that search engines read in order to categorize Web sites by content.6
Meta tags are a valuable tool in sorting out the massive volume of
information on the Web.7
Meta tags can be misused.8 For example, some companies take the
trademark of a competitor and place it in its own Web site's meta tags so
that consumers searching the Web for the competitor's products will
reach the wrongful user's Web site.9 The misuse of meta tags, which
lures potential customers away from the original source of a trademark,
has led to many lawsuits where the company whose trademark is
wrongfully used alleges various trademark violations.'
6. See ADAM L. BROOKMAN, GODFREY & KAHN, S.C., TRADEMARK LAW:
PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT AND LICENSING § 7.03 (2000 Supp.) (stating that meta tags
are embedded in Web pages hiding the terms from users, but allowing search engines to
read them to increase traffic to the site); cf Creating Web Pages, available at
eon.law.harvard.edu/property/introtech/construct.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) ("If the
page contains the term or terms contained in a user's search query, then he may receive a
link to your page among his results.").
7. See Scott Shipman, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace: Can These
Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245, 250 (1998)
(commenting that meta tags allow search engines to provide users with a method of
searching the Web); O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 282 ("Because of the manner in which
search engines work, the metatag has emerged as a key part of Web sites' marketing
strategies.").
8. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 278 (describing the way in which one may
improperly exploit the way search engines work).
9. See Shipman, supra note 7, at 253-55 (noting that Webmasters will "bait" search
engines by filling up Web pages with often-searched terms, whether or not the Web site
has anything to do with the term); O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 278 (noting that while
Internet users never see meta tags, a search engine may return a search result that has
nothing to do with the searched term based on the information given in the meta tags).
10. See Ken Roberts Co. v. Go-To.Com, No. C99-4775-TEH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6740, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2000) ("[Defendant] used and continues to use Ken
Roberts' name for its own profit through the unlawful use of meta-tags."); Petersen
Publ'g. Co. v. Blue Gravity Communications, Inc., No. 00-78 (JEI), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6966, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2000) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs barring
defendant from using plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri
Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging that Welles' use of
Playboy's trademarks in her meta tags constitutes trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and dilution); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp.
2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding several instances where defendant infringed plaintiff's
trademark in its meta tags); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) ("[Diefendants have purposefully
employed deceptive tactics to attract customers to their Web site.., defendants
embedded PEI's trademarks ... within the Web sites' [meta tags]."); Oppedahl & Larson
v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-2-1592, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18359, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb.
6, 1998) (enjoining defendants from using plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging
that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark in meta tags constituted trademark
infringement and unfair competition); see also O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 278 (noting that
1010 [Vol. 50:1009
Meta Tag Trademark Infringement
On the other hand, not all companies that use another's trademark in
meta tags do so wrongfully.'" Such companies may be acting in good
faith, for the purposes of describing their own goods or services. 2
However, since companies started using meta tags for wrongful purposes,
claims of trademark infringement have increased, including increased
claims against innocent users.'
3
Innocent Web advertisers at risk for inappropriate claims of trademark
infringement must ensure that their Commercial General Liability
insurance policies cover claims of trademark infringement because
defending claims, even when innocent, can be costly. 4 By procuring
insurance coverage for such claims, businesses can take advantage of the
rich domain of Internet advertising, while simultaneously protecting
themselves from the risks involved.
This Comment first discusses the basic principles of trademark law and
insurance law applicable to meta tags. Part I of this comment further
addresses meta tag case law and insurance coverage for trademark
violations. This Comment analyzes and identifies two basic approaches
courts have adopted to determine insurance coverage for trademark law
violations; including the facial language approach and a more analytical
approach that delves beyond insurance policy language to determine
insurance coverage. Finally, Part III advocates that businesses with
heavy Internet activities ensure that their Commercial General Liability
insurance policy's Advertising Injury provisions cover trademark law.
the wrongful use of meta tags has led to litigation).
11. See Lisa T. Oratz, Trademarks and the Internet, available at
www.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecomm/trademarks.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2000)
("Sometimes a Web site will use someone else's trademark in its metatags for legitimate
business reasons."); Bitlaw: Trademarks on the Internet, available at
www.bitlaw.com/trademark/internet.htrnl (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (noting that the
distinction between an appropriate and inappropriate use of another's trademark on the
Web is how the mark is used); BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03 (2000 Supp.) ("Meta
tags only become an issue, if at all, when they embody a third party's trademark without
the third party's permission.").
12. See Oratz, supra note 11; Bitlaw: Trademarks on the Internet, supra note 11 ("For
instance, a person who develops a Web site that discusses her experience with Microsoft
software may use Microsoft's trademarks to refer to specific products without fear of
infringement").
13. See Bitlaw: Trademarks on the Internet, supra note 11 ("In addition to the
increased discovery of actual trademark infringers, the expansion of the Internet is also
leading to an expansion of inappropriate trademark infringement allegations.").
14. See Paar, supra note 2, at 1097 (noting that the nature of the Internet forces a
reevaluation of insurance language in determining policy coverage because it gives rise to
new risks and new types of losses); see also BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 9.04 (noting
that trademark infringement actions can be costly).
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Part III suggests steps insurance companies may take to provide
insurance policies that adequately meet the needs of businesses on the
Internet.
I. TRADEMARK LAW FOR META TAGS AND PRINCIPLES TO DETERMINE
INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. The General Principles of Trademark Law Applicable to Meta Tags
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, phrase, product shape, logo, or
other device a manufacturer or merchant uses to identify its goods and to
distinguish those goods from the goods of others.'5 The distinctive
nature of a trademark allows consumers to identify the source of and
choose between different products because a trademark provides
predictability and consistency for the goods they represent. 6 The more
distinctive a trademark, the more protection it is afforded from use by
competitors.'7 Allegations of trademark infringement involving the use
of meta tags usually include claims of trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and trademark dilution."8
The Lanham Act outlines the protections afforded trademark holders
under federal law.'9 Section 32 of the Act provides a civil remedy against
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
16. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 2:3, 3:1, and 3:2 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that trademarks identify the source
of goods, helping consumers identify the expected quality of goods, assisting consumers in
finding goods that suit their needs, and assisting consumers in returning to the identified
product in the future).
17. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 2.02(A). There are five basic categories of
distinction, including: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic. See id.
Devices that are fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive are considered inherently distinctive
and are therefore afforded the most protection. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Descriptive devices are generally not protected, but may gain
protection if over time they become so recognizable that they take on a "secondary
meaning." See Boston Beer Co. L.P. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 175,180 (1st
Cir. 1993). A device that is only descriptive on its face acquires secondary meaning when
consumers recognize the device as representing the specific product. See First Bank v.
First Bank Sys. Inc., 84 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996). Generic marks cannot gain
trademark protection. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. For a more in depth explanation of
each of the five levels of distinctiveness, as well as trademark strength factors in general,
see BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 2.02(A)-(C).
18. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03 (noting that the use of meta tags may
bring about claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark
dilution).
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). Although state law also protects trademarks,
this Comment will focus mainly on the federal protection provided by the Lanham Act
because most of the cases concerning trademark law in the meta tag context arise in the
1012 [Vol. 50:1009
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"[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant.., use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark.. .in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... ,,20 A plaintiff asserting
a claim of trademark infringement must prove three elements.21 First, a
plaintiff must prove its ownership of a registered trademark.22 Second, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant used (or intended to use) the
trademark in interstate commerce.23 Third, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or
24is likely to deceive consumers.
federal courts. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (arising in federal district court); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l,
Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (arising in federal district
court); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(arising in federal district court).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994). Remedies include injunction against further use of
the mark, attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs, and monetary damages. See id.
21. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 9.01(A).
22. See Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1006 (D.
Mass. 1988) ("Under this section, plaintiff is required to prove.., the ownership of a
distinctive mark entitled to trademark protection."); see also BROOKMAN, supra note 6 at
§ 9.01(A) (citing to Beauty Time v. VU Skin Sys., 118 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997) and Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991)). Ownership of a
trademark exists because trademark law provides the owner of the mark with an exclusive
right to use the mark. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 16, at § 2:14. This
exclusive right can be categorized as a property right, sometimes referred to as "valuable
business assets." See id. (quoting Justice Douglas in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916)). However, the "property" right created by a trademark
is different from other property rights because this property right is defined by consumer
perception, rather than physical boundaries or physical possession. See id. Thus
"property" rights or "ownership" in a trademark is determined by the relevant mental
state of consumers. See id. Further, in a legal sense, trademark laws technically do not
protect a trademark from infringement; what the law actually protects is the public's right
to be free of confusion regarding the owner of a mark. See id. Because the property right
associated with trademarks is not physical but more part of the "bundle of rights"
associated with property law, ownership of a trademark deals with intangible intellectual
property. See id. The ownership of a trademark is directly linked to the property right
involved in the owner's ability to exclude others from using that trademark; if one cannot
exclude others from using his or her trademark, there can be no ownership in the mark.
See id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). The statute provides a remedy against:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id.
24. Id.
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The key element in a trademark infringement action is the "likelihood
of confusion" about the origin of the trademark as a result of a
defendant's use of the mark.25 There are roughly eight factors for
determining the likelihood of confusion, including: (1) the overall
similarity of the two marks; (2) the similarities of the products involved;
(3) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) the intent of the defendant; (6) geographic location of the two
products in the marketplace; (7) likely awareness of consumers; and (8)
likelihood of market expansion in the products or services.26
In addition to claiming trademark infringement under Section 32 of the
Lanham Act, a plaintiff may also allege unfair competition under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.27 Section 43(a) "constitutes an unfair
25. See Calamari, 698 F. Supp. at 1006 ("The basis for an action under this section is
use of a mark in interstate commerce which is likely to cause confusion or to deceive
purchasers concerning the origin of the goods or services."); MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS, supra note 16, at § 2:8 ("Whatever route one travels, whether by
trademark infringement or unfair competition, the signs give direction to the same
enquiry-whether defendant's acts are likely to cause confusion."); see, e.g., Bitlaw:
Trademark Infringement, available at www.bitlaw.com/trademark/infringe.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2001) ("In a nutshell, a plaintiff in a trademark case has the burden of
proving that the defendant's use of a mark has created a likelihood-of-confusion about the
origin of the defendant's goods or services.").
26. See Bitaw: Trademark Infringement, supra note 25 (noting that a plaintiff must
show a likelihood of confusion). These factors form from a variety of case law and are
often called the Polaroid factors. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that a trademark owner's chance of success depends upon the
following factors: "the strength of [the owner's] mark, the degree of similarity between the
two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge
the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own
mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers"); see also
New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F. Supp.
2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating further that likelihood of confusion will be presumed
when there is evidence that the defendant intentionally copied the mark). Cf Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (referring to
the Ninth Circuit's similar eight factor test as the Sleekcraft test).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). The section provides:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false of misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin or his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
1014 [Vol. 50:1009
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competition catchall., 28  In contrast to trademark infringement under
Section 32, the unfair competition provision does not require a plaintiff
to claim ownership of a trademark.2 ' The plaintiff "need only plead
some false, deceptive, or misleading act on the part of the defendant,
which act results in a likelihood of confusion or deception as to the origin
or sponsorship of goods, services, or commercial activities and which
causes damage to the plaintiff."3 Similar to trademark infringement, the
gravamen of unfair competition is the likelihood of confusion.' The
same eight factors applied to determine likelihood of confusion under
trademark infringement also apply when reviewing unfair competition
claims.32
Trademark dilution is another means to attack improper use of a
trademark in meta tags. 3 Trademark dilution statutes exist in about half
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely
to be damaged by such act.
Id. Unfair competition generally encompasses a wide variety of activity, of which various
forms of trademark infringement are only one part. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at §
9.01(b) (including, inter alia, in the definition of unfair competition infringement of
trademarks and service marks; dilution of goodwill in trademarks; use of confusingly
similar names, titles, or containers and packaging; infringement of the right of publicity;
theft of trade secrets; misappropriation of valuable business ideas; unreasonable rejection
of goods shipped under contract; and false representation and false advertising).
28. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 9.01(B)(1) (noting that the provision
proscribes "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact or false or
misleading representation of fact that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as
to the affiliation, connection, or association with another person or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of goods, services, or commercial activities") (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)).
29. See id. (noting that rather than requiring proof of ownership, unfair competition
only requires proof of a false, deceptive, or misleading act by the defendant resulting in a
likelihood of consumer confusion).
30. Id. (citing to Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); Waldman Publ'g
Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994); King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824
(2d Cir. 1992)).
31. See id. (noting that a plaintiff in an unfair competition action must prove
likelihood of consumer confusion as a result of the defendant's act).
32. See id. Common law unfair competition laws may also include
"misappropriation." See Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 794 (9th
Cir. 1981). Under California common law for unfair competition, for example,
misappropriation of a trademark does not require the likelihood of confusion, but instead
"prohibits the substantial copying of another's commercial labors even when there is no
likelihood of confusion." Id.
33. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1096 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (finding no cause of action for dilution where the fair use defense is available); New
York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
331, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding dilution based on both blurring and tarnishment); Ken
Roberts Co. v. Go-To.Com, No. C99-4775-TEH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6740, at *2 (N.D.
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of the states.3" Dilution occurs when a defendant's use of the mark
"lessen[s] ... the capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish
the plaintiff's goods or services. 3 5 Many state statutes follow the 1964
Model State Trademark Bill.36 The Bill provides for injunctive relief on
the basis of likelihood of dilution of the distinctive quality of a registered
trademark 7 The Bill permits injunctive relief regardless of the absence
of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion by
consumers.
38
As of 1996, plaintiffs may also assert a claim of dilution under federal
law.9 The federal statute, found within the Lanham Act, provides
injunctive relief when another business' commercial use of a famous
mark causes dilution of the mark's distinctiveness in the marketplace.4 °
Thus, a plaintiff may only seek relief for the dilution of a mark that is
Cal. May 1 , 2000) (restraining defendants from diluting plaintiff's trademark).
34. See e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213 (Supp. 1999); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 14330 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-11a - 35-11m (1997); FLA. STAT. ch.
495.151 (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1035/15 (1993); IOWA CODE § 548.113 (1997); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 110B, §12 (1999);
MINN. STAT. § 325d.44 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.061(1) (1990); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1980); 54 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1.102 (2000 Supp.); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-25-513 (1996); TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1999).
35. BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 1.02(C)(2).
36. See id. at § 9.01(B)(4)(a) (stating that Section 12 of the 1964 Model State
Trademark Bill is the basis for many state statutes).
37. See id. The applicable portion of the Bill provides:
SECTION 12. INJURY TO BUSINESS REPUTATION; DILUTION.
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade
name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence
of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Id. (quoting 1964 Model State Trademark Bill).
38. See id.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997) (including the remedy for dilution).
Federal dilution law does not preempt state law; a plaintiff may assert either or both of the
claims in an action for relief. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 9.01(B).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997). The statute states that(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if
such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection.
1016 [Vol. 50:1009
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both famous and distinctive.4" The federal statute defines dilution itself
as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of...
competition... or... likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
4 2
The "lessening of capacity" includes both "blurring" and
"tamishment." 43 Blurring is found where the mark is used by another on
dissimilar products, lessening the original mark's value." Tarnishment
takes place where another links the mark with unrelated products that
are of reduced quality or image, causing the public to associate the
plaintiff's product with the lower quality product or image.45
A successful plaintiff in a trademark action is "entitled to injunctive
relief and may also be entitled to monetary damages., 46  Monetary
damages may be awarded in an amount equal to the profits gained by the
infringer due to the unauthorized use of the mark. 7 Further, damages
may be awarded for unjust enrichment, or to compensate the plaintiff for
41. Id. The statute lists some factors a court may consider in determining whether or
not a mark is famous and distinctive:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of the use of the same or similar marks by third parties,
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (West Supp. 1997).
43. See Franklin Res., Inc. v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 322, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that a showing of either blurring or tarnishment is sufficient to
prove a likelihood of dilution).
44. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
blurring involves "the whittling away of an established trademark's selling power through
its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products").
45. See id. ("'Tarnishment' generally arises when the plaintiff's trademark is linked to
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely
to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner's prod uct").
46. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 9.05 (stating that a successful plaintiff is
generally "entitled to injunctive relief and may also be entitled to monetary damages").
47. See id. at § 9.05(B) (noting that damages may not be available where the plaintiff
files suit before the defendant has obtained any benefit from the infringement).
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lost profits caused by the infringement.48 There are no definitive rules to
determine the circumstances under which a court may grant monetary
relief." Some courts require a finding of willfulness (i.e., intentional
infringement) on the part of the defendant.5" Other jurisdictions,
however, do not require willfulness or actual damage to the plaintiff, but
rather determine the applicability of monetary damages based on the
51
overall circumstances of the case.
Fair use is an affirmative defense in a trademark infringement claim. 2
The Lanham Act outlines a three-prong test to establish the fair use
defense under the Act: "(1) Defendant's use of the term is not as a
trademark or service mark; (2) Defendant uses the term 'fairly and in
good faith;"' and "(3) Defendant uses the term '[o]nly to describe' its
goods or services. '' 53 Thus, the use of another's mark to describe goods
or services is permissible when done in good faith.54
B. The Use of Meta Tags
A Web page's meta tags are invisible to an Internet user.55 A Web
48. See id. (noting that a plaintiff may recover for lost profits directly caused by the
infringement and that because actual damages are difficult to prove recovery can be based
on unjust enrichment).
49. See id.
50. See Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc., 80 F.3d
749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that for a plaintiff to recover damages and attorney's fees
based on defendant's profits as a result of the infringement, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted in bad faith).
51. See Adray v. Adry-Mart Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a court
may also consider a plaintiff's unclean hands to determine the appropriate remedy in a
trademark infringement action).
52. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 10.02(H) ("The fair use defense, can be
generally equated to a claim of non-trademark use").
53. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, at § 11.49
(1999)). Significant to a later analysis regarding competitor use of meta tags in Part II of
this Comment, when describing what may constitute evidence of bad faith (precluding the
defense based on element two), the court again quotes McCarthy, stating that "a
defendant's use with the intent to 'trade upon and dilute the good will' of a plaintiff's
mark," is evidence of bad faith. Id.
54. See id
55. See Oratz, supra note 11 (noting that although meta tags are visible to search
engines, they are not visible to users). Cf. Creating Web Pages, supra note 6 ("Metatags
are written into the HTML document, but they do not appear on the user's screen."). It is
important to note that the World Wide Web and Internet, though often used
interchangeably, are not the same thing. See How the Web Works, available at
eon.law.Harvard.edu/property/introtech/webworks.html (last visited June 1, 2001). They
serve two distinct functions; the Internet is actually made up of over 100,000
interconnected networks all over the world. See id.; see also Technical Glossary, available
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page is created using Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), a simple
code that describes the content of a Web page and provides display
instructions to a Web browser. 56 When accessing a Web page, a user sees
text and graphics, while HTML is a hidden code that describes how those
text and graphics are arranged.57  A Web page developer places the
page's meta tags within this hidden code.58
One of the purposes of meta tags is to guide search engines in indexing
Web pages.59 When a Web user enters a search term into a search
engine, the search engine compiles results by matching the search term
with Web page meta tags.60 Thus, the search engine results include those
pages in which the meta tags match the user's search term.6 ' For
example, if a Web user wants to search for Web pages containing
information on Nike shoes, the user places "Nike" as a search term in a
search engine. Search engines will then return results containing a list of
at eon.law.harvard.edu/property/introtech/webworks.html (last visited June 1, 2001). The
information on the World Wide Web is only one type of information transported over the
Internet. See How the Web Works, available at
eon.law.harvard.edu/property/introtech/webworks.html (last visited June 1, 2001).
56. See Creating Web Pages, supra note 6 and accompanying text ("All web pages are
written in a standard format known as hypertext markup language, or HTML."). Cf
Oratz, supra note 11 ("Metatags are part of the HTML code of a Web site ....."). A Web
browser is a software program that provides access to the Web, such as Microsoft Internet
Explorer and Netscape Navigator. See Surf the Web: Web Browsers, available at
www.learnthenet.com/englishlhtml/l 2browser.htm (last visited June 1, 2001).
57. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03.
58. See Creating Web Pages, supra note 6. There are two different types of meta tags;
keyword meta tags and description meta tags. See Shipman, supra note 7, at 246. For the
purposes of this Comment, there is no need to distinguish between keyword and
description meta tags.
59. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6 at § 7.03 ("'Meta tags' are hidden text 'buried' in
the coding behind a Web page."). See also Creating Web Pages, supra note 6 (noting that
meta tags may improve the chances that a Web site will end up at the top of a search query
list); Oratz, supra note 11 (noting that meta tags are visible to search engines, which act as
a guide for users searching the World Wide Web). There are two different types of search
engines. See www.learnthenet.com/english/html/15wsrch.htm, (last visited June 1, 2001).
Directories, such as Yahoo, categorize Web sites into different groups. See id. For more
specific information, there are also Web indexes. See id. Indexes actually look to the
content of the page and are also called "spiders" or "robots" because they search the
entire Web actually indexing each word on the Web. See id. These indexes, like Alta
Vista and Lycos, read meta tags and find the individual Web pages that match a search
term. See id.
60. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03 (stating that meta tags are embedded in
Web pages hiding the terms from users, but allowing search engines to read them in order
to increase traffic to the site). See also. Creating Web Pages, supra note 6 ("If the page
contains the term or terms contained in a user's search query, then he may receive a link
to your page among his results.").
61. See BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03.
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Web pages that list "Nike" as a keyword in their meta tags. This process
of matching search terms with meta tag keywords is a valuable way for
some search engines to sort through millions of Web pages, making it
easier for users to locate relevant pages.62
Meta tags are useful tools for search engines to index Web pages.63
However, consider a variation on the above example concerning a user
who wishes to search for information on Nike shoes. If Reebok knows
that thousands of Web users employ the search term "Nike" daily to
search for sneakers, Reebok (or some other competitor) might place the
keyword "Nike" in its meta tag source code to compete with Nike. Now,
not only do some search engines return results listing Web pages that
provide information on Nike shoes, but they also return results listing
Web pages that provide information on Reebok shoes as well. This
example illustrates a competitor's (Reebok) use of another company's
(Nike) trademark in its meta tags. The example is similar to recent cases
where one company alleges trademark infringement, unfair competition,
and/or trademark dilution against another for the wrongful use of its
64
meta tags.
C. General Insurance Law Principles and Precedent Applied to Claims of
Trademark Law Violations
Not all situations involving one company's use of another's trademark
62. See Shipman, supra note 7, at 250, 252-53 (commenting that meta tags allow
search engines to provide users with a method of searching the Web).
63. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 282 ("Because of the manner in which search
engines work, the metatag has emerged as a key part of Web sites' marketing strategies.").
64. See Ken Roberts Co. v. Go-To.Com, No. C99-4775-TEH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6740, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2000) ("[Defendant] used and continues to use Ken
Roberts' name for its own profit through the unlawful use of meta-tags... ."); Petersen
Publ'g. Co. v. Blue Gravity Communications, Inc., No. 00-78 (JEI), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6966, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2000) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs barring
defendant from using plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri
Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging that Welles' use of
Playboy's trademarks in her meta tags constitutes trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and dilution); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp.
2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding several instances where defendant infringed plaintiff's
trademark in its meta tags); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) ("[D]efendants have purposefully
employed deceptive tactics to attract customers to their Web site ... defendants
embedded PEI's trademarks... within the Web sites' [meta tags]."); Oppedahl & Larson
v. Advanced Concepts, No.97-2-1592, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18359, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 6,
1998) (enjoining defendants from using plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags);.Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging
that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark in [meta tags] constituted trademark
infringement and unfair competition).
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in its meta tags constitutes trademark infringement; 65 there are some
legitimate purposes for such use. 6 Unfortunately, the increase in
discovery of actual trademark infringers has led to an increase in lawsuits
inappropriately alleging trademark infringement violations against
companies that properly use the trademarks of others on their Web
pages.67 Thus, situations may arise where an innocent user must defend
against an allegation of trademark infringement. 68  For these innocent
users, it is important to determine whether or not their commercial
insurance policy implicates a duty of the insurance company to defend
them against a trademark infringement claim.6
Generally, courts require an insurer to defend its insured when the
facts alleged by the claimant bring the incident within policy coverage.7
The circumstances that implicate an insurance company's general duty to
defend its insured are extremely liberal in favor of the insured. 7' As long
as there is a potential that claims against an insured fall under the
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy protections, an insurer is
required to defend.72 To determine whether the alleged claims may fall
65. See Oratz, supra note 11 ("Sometimes a Web site will use someone else's
trademark in its metatags for legitimate business reasons .... ); Bitlaw: Trademarks on the
Internet, supra note 11 (noting that the distinction between an appropriate and
inappropriate use of another's trademark on the Web is how the mark is used);
BROOKMAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03 (2000) ("Meta tags only become an issue, if at all,
when they embody a third party's trademark without the third party's permission.").
66. See Oratz, supra note 11; see also Bitlaw: Trademarks on the Internet, supra note
11 ("For instance, a person who develops a web site that discusses her experience with
Microsoft software may use Microsoft's trademarks to refer to specific products without
fear of infringement.").
67. See Bitlaw: Trademarks on the Internet, supra note 11.
68. See id. ("In addition to the increased discovery of actual trademark infringers, the
expansion of the Internet is also leading to an expansion of inappropriate trademark
infringement allegations.").
69. See Paar, supra note 2, at 1097 (noting that the nature of the Internet forces a
reevaluation of insurance language in determining policy coverage because it gives rise to
new risks and new types of losses).
70. See Maxtech Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 98-56729, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
29978, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999) (applying California law); Assurance Co. v. J.P.
Structures, Inc., Nos. 95-2384; 96-1010/96-1027, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34565, at *8 (6th
Cir. Dec. 3, 1997, 1997) (applying Michigan law). See also DESKBOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW 23 (14th ed. 2000) ("Generally, the courts hold that an
insurer's duty to defend an insured in a lawsuit is triggered when any person makes a claim
against the insured, and the facts as alleged by the claimant bring the incident within the
purview of the policy covering the insured.").
71. See, e.g., Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 299778, at *4 (stating that "[a]ny doubt
as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend should be resolved in the insured's
favor").
72. See J.P. Structures, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34565, at *8 (requiring insurance
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under the policy, an insurer must consider the policy language along with
the complaint against the insured."3 The duty to defend an insured is
quite broad, but if the acts alleged are clearly not, within the policy
coverage, the insurer is not required to defend.74
CGL policies generally include an "Advertising Injury" provision.75
These provisions provide protection against claims or injuries arising
from a business' advertising activities.76 Depending upon the wording of
the policy, some CGL policies include coverage for trademark
infringement, while others do not have this provision. 7
CGL policies may also contain exclusions from policy coverage, such
as prior acts exclusions or exclusions for intentional acts.78 Prior acts
exclusions deny coverage for any claims arising out of acts that took
company to defend when underlying claims "arguably fall within the language of the
policy"); see also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Power Lift, Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *4 (9th Cir. June 22, 1998) (noting that although current
allegations indicate coverage exclusion, the potential that a subsequent amended
complaint may bring the allegations within coverage implicates the duty to defend).
73. See Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
duty to defend depends primarily upon the face of the underlying complaint); United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 985 (Pa. 1986) ("As long as the complaint
comprehends an injury which may be within the scope of the policy, the company must
defend the insured until the insurer can confine the claim to a recovery that the policy
does not cover.").
74. See Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *5.
75. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW, supra note 70, at 497; see
also Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting the
existence of "Advertising Injury" language in standard policy forms published by the
Insurance Services Office). The Novell court set forth an example of standard Advertising
Injury clause language:
When used with respect to insurance under this policy: ADVERTISING
INJURY means injury arising solely out of one or more of the following offenses
committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or services:
1. oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or
organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or
services;
2. oral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy;
3. misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business; or
4. infringement of copyrighted advertising materials, titles or slogans.
Id. at 986.
76. See Novell, 141 F.3d at 986.
77. See id. at 987.
78. See Beacon Ins. Co. v. Kleoudis, 652 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1995) (holding that
intentional acts exclusion did not apply where injury was neither expected nor intended);
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Power Lift, Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
13602, at *4 (9th Cir. June 2, 1998) (supporting the premise that intentional acts may be
excluded from coverage); Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *5-*6 (reviewing a
prior acts exclusion).
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place prior to the effective date of the policy. 7 9  Intentional acts
exclusions preclude coverage of claims based on an insured's intentional
violation of the law.80
The question of whether a CGL policy covers trademark infringement
depends upon the language of the Advertising Injury provision.8' Some
policies explicitly cover trademark infringement;8 2 however, many
policies do not specifically include or exclude trademark infringement.83
Because CGL policies often do not specifically include or exclude
coverage for trademark infringement, insured parties often argue that
coverage exists under the Advertising Injury provision of their CGL
policy.84  "Advertising injury" generally includes in its definition
coverage for "'misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business.' and "infringement of copyright[ed] [advertising materials,]
title[s] or slogan[s]. ,85 These are the two elements under which insured
parties argue that trademark infringement may fall.86
79. See Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *6. The Ninth Circuit held in
Maxtech that there was no duty for the insurance company to defend for claims of
trademark violations. See id. Although the policy at issue specifically covered
"infringement of trademarked or service marked titles or slogans," coverage was
nonetheless excluded. See id. at *5-*6. The court held that the policy's prior acts
exclusion precluded coverage because the insured's first publication of the material
causing the injury occurred prior to the beginning of the policy. See id. at *6. Therefore,
although the claim itself was covered, the prior acts exclusion precluded coverage. See id.
80. See DESKBOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW, supra note 70,
at 497.
81. See Novell, 141 F.3d at 985-86 (stating that to determine coverage the court must
analyze the offense in relation to the Advertising Injury provision).
82. See Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *5; see also supra nn. 75-77 and
accompanying text.
83. See supra nn. 75-77 and accompanying text.
84. See Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *2 (avoiding the issue of coverage
for trademark violations based on an Advertising Injury provision by excluding coverage
based on a prior acts exclusion); Novell, 141 F.3d at 989 (holding that the insurer had no
obligation to defend the insured on trademark violations); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Power Lift, Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *2-*3 (9th Cir. June
22, 1998) (holding that a potential for coverage requires the insurer to defend the insured
on trademark violations).
85. See Novell, 141 F.3d at 987; Power Lift, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *3
(noting that in 1986 the Insurance Services Office, which provides standard insurance
forms, added "misappropriation of... style of doing business" to the standard insurance
policy language, which already included "infringement of copyright, title, or slogan").
86. See Power Lift, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *2 (noting that allegations of
trademark infringement may fall under "'misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business"' in a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy Advertising Injury
clause); ShoLodge, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 168 F.3d 256, 258-59 (6th Cir. 1999)
(alleging unsuccessfully that coverage for trademark law violations based on both
"misappropriation of advertising idea or style of doing business," and "infringement of
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In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Power Lift,8 the Ninth Circuit
reversed a lower court ruling that the language "'misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business' did not cover trademark
violations.8" The Ninth Circuit announced that the law of California
dictated that trademark violations are within the scope of the
misappropriation provision of a CGL policy.89
The Ninth Circuit further ruled that coverage of a claim alleging
trademark infringement triggered an insurance company's duty to
defend, even when the underlying complaint alleged an insured party's
intentional trademark violation."0 Despite the existence of an intentional
acts exclusion in Power Lift's CGL policy, the court found a basis for
insurance coverage because intentional wrongdoing is not a necessary
element of trademark infringement.9' Therefore, the intentional acts
exclusion did not apply.9" The Ninth Circuit also noted that since some
uses of another's trademark are legitimate in advertising, and wrongful
use is not always willful, California law would not preclude coverage.93
Thus, although intentional acts are generally excluded from CGL policy
coverage, under the Ninth Circuit's ruling on California law, an insurance
company is required to defend the insured party even where the
complaint alleges only intentional trademark infringement.94
However, the Sixth Circuit, in ShoLodge, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.," held that neither the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business" nor the "infringement of copyright, title, or
slogan" language of Advertising Injury provisions cover trademark
infringement.96 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that if Travelers intended to
include trademark infringement as a covered offense, the company
copyright, title, or slogan"); Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *2-*3 (alleging that
trademark infringement falls under the Advertising Injury clause language).
87. Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602 (9th Cir. June 22, 1998).
88. See id. at *1-*2 (reversing the district court ruling that there was no duty to
defend in Lanham Act violations).
89. See id. at *4 (citing Lebas Fashion Imp. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d 36, 41-47, 50 Cal. App. 4th 548, 558-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
90. See id. at *4.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at *5 ("Similarly, if use of the trademarks is ultimately found to be
wrongful, that does not mean that the wrong must necessarily have been willful.").
94. See id. (holding that in California there is a duty to defend even where a claim of
trademark infringement alleges only intentional infringement).
95. 168 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1999).
96. See id. at 250-60 (relying on Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d
795 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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would have enumerated it in the policy as specifically as it listed
copyright infringement.97 In reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit
relied heavily on Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper National Insurance
Co.,98 in which the court expressly held that "'misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business' does not extend coverage to
trademark law violations. 99
D. Trademark Law Precedent Regarding Meta Tags
The first meta tag usage disputes ended in settlement, making it
difficult to determine the state of the law on the subject.00 However,
courts have adjudicated a small number of cases involving meta tags.'0'
Several of these cases deal with other forms of alleged infringement in
addition to the limited area of meta tags, nevertheless they are
instructive on the state of the law regarding meta tag usage.'°0
In the first of the meta tag cases, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin
Designer Label, °3 the District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Playboy Enterprises injunctive relief against Calvin
97. See id. at 260 ("The absence of any express reference to trademark or service
mark infringement in the policy's definition of Advertising Injury further bolsters this
interpretation.").
98. 99 F.3d 795,806-07 (6th Cir. 1996).
99. See ShoLodge, 168 F.3d at 259 (holding that "the decision in Advance Watch is
applicable here and defeats the argument made by ShoLodge that service mark
infringement falls within the category of 'misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business"').
100. See John R. Warner, Trademark Infringement Online: Appropriate Federal Relief
From the Illicit Use of Trademarked Material in Web Site Meta Tags, 22 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 133, 150 (2000) (noting that the first two meta tag disputes settled before trial and
ended in injunctive relief agreed to by the parties).
101. See, e.g., Ken Roberts Co. v. Go-To.Com, No. C99-4775-TEH, 2000 LEXIS 6740,
*6 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2000) ("[Defendant] used and continues to use Ken Roberts' name
for its own profit through the unlawful use of meta-tags. ... "); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging that Welles' use of
Playboy's trademarks in her meta tags constitutes trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and dilution); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't, Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1999) (remanding with instructions to enter a preliminary
injunction in favor of plaintiff); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding several instances where defendant infringed
plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags);.Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-
734-A, 1998 WL 724000, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) ("[D]efendants have purposefully
employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers to their Web site.. defendants
embedded PEI's trademarks... within the Web sites' [meta tags].").
102. See Warner, supra note 100, at 149-50. Only the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield has
specifically discussed trademark infringement through the use of meta tags separately
from other forms of trademark infringement. See Brookfield, 174 F. 3d at 1061-66.
103. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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Designer Label for Calvin's use of Playboy's trademarked words,
"Playboy" and "Playmate," in its meta tags.' °4 The Calvin court seemed
most influenced by the defendant's blatant attempt to use the trademarks
in order to take advantage of Playboy's goodwill and recognition.'05 The
court noted the similarity between Calvin's Web site and Playboy's Web
site in determining that there was a high likelihood of confusion that may
lead consumers to believe Playboy and Calvin were somehow
affiliated.' °6 Moreover, the court also held that the defendant's willful
use of the trademarks constituted dilution of Playboy's trademark
because it blurred the distinctiveness of the trademarked words.
7
After successfully defending its trademarks against Calvin Designer
Label, Playboy was victorious in its next meta tag dispute, Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International, Inc. '0o Defendant
AsiaFocus, like Calvin, used Playboy's trademarked words, "Playboy"
and "Playmate," in its domain name and meta tags. 09 Playboy sued
AsiaFocus for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
dilution."' The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
in Playboy's favor on all three claims."' Like the Calvin court, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seemed especially
affected by what, in its view, constituted "willful infringement,"
evidenced by the defendant's purposeful deception."2 However, rather
than granting an injunction against AsiaFocus, the court awarded
104. See id. at 1221-22. Not only were the words "Playboy" and "Playmate" used in
the defendant's meta tags, but also in its domain name and within the site itself. See id at
1221. The trademarks within the site were hidden from the viewer by using buried code,
making them invisible in a way similar to meta tags. See id.
105. See id. at 1221-22.
106. See id. (enjoining defendant from using Playboy's trademarks in such a way that
would cause consumer confusion and the erroneous belief that the Web sites were
related).
107. See id. at 1221 ("Plaintiff PEI has demonstrated a sufficient ... likelihood of
success on the merits of its trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution
claims....").
108. No. 97-734-A, 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998).
109. See id at *3.
110. See id. at *1.
111. See id. at *5-7. Further, the court specifically sided with Playboy on the meta tag
issue, holding that the use of the meta tags resulted in the dilution of Playboy's
trademarks. See id. at *7.
112. See id. at *4, *9 (noting that defendants' active encouragement of other Web sites
to promote the infringing site was evidence of willfulness). The court found AsiaFocus'
acts willful because they "purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers to
their Web site under the guise that their sites are sponsored by or somehow affiliated with
[Playboy]." Id. at *3.
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monetary damages for the first time in a meta tag case.113
In a separate meta tag case, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles,
Inc.," 4 Playboy was not as successful." 5  Terri Welles was a former
Playboy model that appeared in several Playboy magazines since 1980
and was Playmate of the Year in 1981.6 In 1997, Welles started a Web
site, www.terriwelles.com, to promote her modeling career." 7 Welles'
Web site includes Playboy trademarks in both the site itself and the meta
tags, including "Playboy," "Playmate," and "PMOY '81" (Playmate of
the Year 1981).'18 Unlike other cases, Welles' Web site contained
disclaimers indicating that her Web site was not related to Playboy.' '
When Welles refused to stop using the trademarks, Playboy sued her for
numerous causes of action including trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and dilution under the Lanham Act.2
The District Court for the Southern District of California ruled for
Welles, upholding her defense of fair use, because she used the
trademarked terms in good faith only to describe herself.' 2' As with the
court's decisions in both Calvin and AsiaFocus, the Welles court
emphasized the intent of the defendant. 22 Because Welles' intent to use
the trademarked terms was predicated upon good faith as evidenced by
disclaimers, the court found no violation of trademark law. 23
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts discussed the meta
tag issue in Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. 24 The
113. See id. at *9. The court awarded Playboy $500,000 for each of four violations, as
well as $1,000,000 for "willful infringement" that was "sufficiently broad, extensive,
blatant, and willful" to warrant the maximum damage award. See id. at *9.
114. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
115. See id. at 1070 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
116. See id. at 1071.
117. See id. Welles' Web site included photographs of herself, a fan club posting
board, an autobiography, and a listing of upcoming events and appearances. See id.
118. See id. at 1072.
119. See id. at 1080.
120. See id. at 1072 (noting that Playboy first invited Welles to join Playboy's new
"Cyber Club," and that when Welles refused Playboy demanded that she remove
Playboy's trademark from her Web site).
121. See id. at 1079-80. The Welles decision is the only meta tag case to date in which
the defendant prevailed. See Warner, supra note 100, at 165.
122. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80 ("[T]he court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
identify any conduct of Ms. Welles that is sufficiently blameworthy.").
123. See id. at 1095-96 ("[I]n light of the fact that there is no evidence of an intent by
Ms. Welles to trade upon the goodwill of Plaintiffs marks by falsely implying sponsorship
by or affiliation with PEI... Plaintiff has failed to raise a material issue of fact concerning
the fair use of PEI terms.").
124. 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
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parties involved were direct competitors.125 The two corporations, Niton
and Radiation Monitoring Devices (RMD), produced lead measuring
products.1 26 While RMD did not specifically use Niton's trademarks,
Niton alleged that RMD placed references and links to Niton's Web site
in its meta tag code in an attempt to lure Niton's customers to its own
site. 27 The court granted Niton relief through a modified injunction,
ordering RMD to stop using Niton's references and links in its meta tags,
prohibiting attempts to actually claim or give the impression that RMD's
site was related to Niton. 1
28
While the previous courts discussed meta tags in conjunction with
other issues, such. as infringement within the visible text of Web sites, the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp.12 9 was the first to specifically address the use of
another's trademark in Web site meta tags as a separate issue.1
30
Brookfield Communications, Inc. ("Brookfield") created and sold
software under the trademark "MovieBuff," while the defendant, West
Coast Entertainment ("West Coast"), rented videos and held rights to
the domain name moviebuff.com.' Brookfield sued West Coast,
alleging that West Coast's use of Brookfield's trademark in its domain
125. See id. at 103.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. The injunction was tentative because it allowed RMD to seek a change in
the order for cause later on, and also allowed RMD to continue its unfair practices upon
providing Niton with compensation. See id. at 105. The court's failure to discuss RMD's
intent is unusual, especially given the extreme and pervasive nature of the infringement.
See id Niton previously filed suit against RMD for trademark violations through other
forms of advertising before discovering the meta tag copying. See id. at 104. Robert
Bowley, a Niton employee, learned that RMD's Web site infringed Niton's trademark by
chance while servicing Niton's site. See id. Bowley performed a search for "Niton" and
discovered that the search returned several results for RMD Web sites. See id. Bowley
used Netscape's "View Source" command to discover that RMD's meta tags contained
several terms related to Niton, but not to RMD. See id. Further, after performing a
search using the phrase "home page of Niton Corporation," the search turned up five
matches for RMD's Web sites, revealing that five of RMD's Web sites contained the meta
tag "The Home Page of Niton Corporation, makers of the finest lead, radon, and multi-
element detectors." See id.
129. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
130. See id at 1061. Two more recent cases, New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub.
Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), and Ken
Roberts Co. v. Go-To.Com, No. C99-4775-TEH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6740 (N.D. Cal.
May 11, 2000), also provided relief for plaintiffs. See Eric Louis Associates, 79 F. Supp. 2d
at 356; Ken Roberts, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6740, at *17-*18.
131. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042.
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name and meta tags constituted trademark infringement.1 32
The Ninth Circuit found for Brookfield as to the trademark
infringement of the MovieBuff term in West Coast's domain name, but
further discussed the meta tag issue. ' The court found infringement on
the meta tag issue based on "initial interest confusion" rather than on the
traditional "likelihood of confusion" rationale. 134  Initial interest
confusion, according to the court, meant that consumers looking for
Brookfield's Web site would initially be diverted to West Coast's site.
1 35
Though the court was confident that these consumers would easily
realize the mistake, the court feared that they would stay at West Coast's
site. 3 6  The court ruled that this initial interest confusion would
132. See id. at 1041.
133. See id. at 1061-62. A "domain name" is the combination of a Web site owner's
"unique" name (such as "terriwelles") and a generic top-level domain (such as ".com",
which when combined forms the domain name terriwelles.com). See Technical Glossary,
supra note 55. The Ninth Circuit in Brookfield distinguished between the problem with
using another's trademark in a domain name and using it in meta tags:
Although entering "MovieBuff" into a search engine is likely to bring up a list
including "westcoastvideo.com" if West Coast has included that term in its
metatags, the resulting confusion is not as great as where West Coast uses the
"moviebuff.com" domain name.... Nevertheless, West Coast's use of
"moviebuff.com" in metatags will still result in what is known as initial interest
confusion. Web surfers looking for Brookfield's "MovieBuff" products who are
taken by a search engine to "westcoastvideo.com" will find a database similar
enough to "MovieBuff" such that a sizeable number of consumers who were
originally looking for Brookfield's product will simply decide to utilize West
Coast's offerings instead. Although there is no source confusion in the sense that
consumers know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there is
nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using "moviebuff.com"
or "MovieBuff" to divert people looking for "MovieBuff" to its Web site, West
Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its
mark.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
134. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062-63.
135. See id. at 1062.
136. See id. The court analogized the danger to a company created by initial interest
confusion in the meta tag context to improperly placed billboards:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with
another's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor
(let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway reading-"West
Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at
Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's
store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate
West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they
may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not
worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a
Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they
are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no
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improperly benefit West Coast, lending to West Coast the goodwill and
recognition of Brookfield's established trademark.'37 Thus, the court
reversed and remanded the case, ordering a preliminary injunction
against West Coast's use of the MovieBuff term. 1
38
II. ADVERTISING INJURY PROVISIONS AND TRADEMARK VIOLATIONS
FOR META TAG USE - PRECEDENT REVEALS INCONSISTENT ANSWERS
Once a plaintiff alleges trademark infringement against a business for
the wrongful use of meta tags in its Web advertising activities, the
insured defendant and its insurance carrier must determine whether the
insurance company has a duty to defend under the insured business'
CGL policy.139 Trademark infringement in the meta tag context depends
upon the intent of the defendant and the likelihood of confusion caused
by the use of the plaintiff's trademarked terms.140 Whether a standard
CGL policy covers such claims depends on whether the relevant
jurisdiction takes a "facial language" approach or a "look beyond the
language" approach.
14 1
A. Intent and Likelihood of Confusion Are Significant Factors to
Determine if the Use of Another's Trademark as a Meta Tag Constitutes a
Trademark Law Violation
Existing case law on meta tag usage heavily favors plaintiffs."42 With
the exception of the Welles decision, courts have been inclined to find
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution in
reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West
Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does
not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's
acquired goodwill.
Id. at 1064 (citing to Blockbuster Entm't. Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513
(E.D. Mich. 1994)).
137. See id. (noting an example to show that West Coast would benefit from the
acquired goodwill that Brookfield had established in its trademark).
138. See id. at 1066-67.
139. See supra Part I(C) and accompanying notes (discussing general insurance
principles and concluding that to determine insurance coverage, one must examine the
complaint together with the CGL policy).
140. See infra Part II(A)(1)(a) and (b) and accompanying notes (explaining that both
intent and likelihood of confusion are important factors to determine trademark violations
for wrongful use of meta tags).
141. See infra Part II(B)(1) and (2) and accompanying notes (discussing both the facial
language and look beyond the language approaches and the case law supporting each
approach).
142. See supra Part I(D) and accompanying notes (noting that the Welles decision is
the only meta tag case where the defendant prevailed).
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meta tag cases. The decisions in both Welles and Brookfield reveal
that primary factors in resolving meta tag usage disputes are the
likelihood of confusion and the defendant's intent in using another's
trademark. 4 '
1. Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition in a Meta Tag
Context
Case law suggests a two-part analysis to consider trademark
infringement in the context of meta tag disputes.' 5 First, one must
consider whether the circumstances support a fair use defense, bringing
the defendant's intent for using another's trademark in its meta tags to
the forefront. 4 ' Second, one must determine the likelihood of confusion
or initial interest confusion caused by the defendant's use of another's
trademark in its meta tags.'47 Both parts of the analysis are required;
even the fair use of another's trademark must pass both parts of the
analysis. 48
a. Intent as a Factor in Determining Liability
Prior to Welles, courts consistently ruled that use of a competitor's
trademark in a Web site's meta tags violated trademark laws. 4' The
143. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1.998 WL
724000, at *7-*8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (finding the defendant liable for trademark
infringement, unfair competition, and dilution).
144. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1095 (S.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding it significant that Playboy could not produce any evidence that Welles
intentionally diverted customers from Playboy's site to her own by trading on Playboy's
goodwill); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1061-66 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[I]n Dr. Suess, [the Ninth Circuit] explicitly recognizes that the
use of another's trademark in a manner calculated 'to capture initial consumer attention,
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an
infringement."') (citing to Dr. Suess Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1405 (9th Cir. 1997)).
145. See infra Part II(A)(1)(a) and (b) and accompanying notes (contending that meta
tag case law suggests the two-part analysis).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1999) (requiring a showing of good faith for a fair use
defense).
147. See supra nn. 25 & 31 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement for
finding a likelihood of confusion in every trademark infringement and unfair competition
claim).
148. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074, 1081 (noting that the Ninth Circuit, as well as a
majority of courts, holds that there can be no fair use where there is a likelihood of
confusion).
149. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp 1220
(N.D. Cal. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 WL
103120011
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AsiaFocus court, finding trademark violations, ruled in Playboy's favor
because it found that AsiaFocus purposely and willfully misled visitors of
its site, giving the impression that it was connected to Playboy
Enterprises.' 5° Also finding trademark violations, the court in Niton
Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. discussed in detail the facts
revealing that Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. (RMD) purposely
diverted users from Niton's Web site by copying Niton's meta tags.1
5
'
Most significantly, the Ninth Circuit, in Brookfield, specifically discussed
meta tags, and barred West Coast's use of Brookfield's trademark
because of initial interest confusion. 1
52
In contrast to prior cases, the defendant in Welles employed the fair
use defense, therefore bringing her intent to the forefront of the court's
consideration of the lawful use of a competitor's trademark in meta
tags. 153 The fair use defense requires that a defendant's use of another's
mark be done "fairly and in good faith" and is used "only to describe the
goods or services."' 54  Thus, the availability of the fair use defense
primarily depends upon the intent of the defendant when using the
plaintiff's mark. 15 In the Welles case, for example, the court determined
that Welles was entitled to the fair use defense, noting that Playboy
724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998).
150. See AsiaFocus, 1998 WL 724000, at *9 ("The magistrate judge concludes that the
willful infringement embodied in the offending web-sites themselves is sufficiently broad,
extensive, blatant, and willful to warrant award of the maximum statutory amount of
$1,000,000.").
151. Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104-05 (D.
Mass. 1998).
152. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061, 1066 (noting that the confusion caused by the
use of another's trademark in one's meta tags is precisely the type of confusion that
trademark law is designed to prevent).
153. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80 (discussing defendant's intent for using the
mark as part of the elements of the fair use defense).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1994) (emphasis added). The defense also requires that
the defendant's use of the term is "otherwise than as a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)
(1994). The Ninth Circuit interprets this provision to mean that to be a non-trademark
use, the use "cannot amount to trademark infringement or unfair competition." Welles, 78
F. Supp. 2d at 1080-81. However, this element is not really at issue in a meta tag dispute.
A defendant using another's trademark as a meta tag does not do so by using the
competitor's trademark as it's own. The competitor's own trademark is more or less a tool
used by the defendant in such a way that it actually lures customers away from the
competitor. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064 (noting that in the context of wrongful meta
tag usage, the danger is not that consumers will think the plaintiff and defendant are
related or that the mark belongs to the defendant, but that the defendant will lure
customers away from the plaintiff using the plaintiff's mark, thereby profiting from the
plaintiff's time and effort).
155. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (finding the Plaintiff's intent a significant factor
in determining the availability of the fair use defense).
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failed to show any convincing evidence of bad faith by Welles in
connection with her use of the Playboy marks. 156 On the contrary, the
court found significant evidence of Welles' good faith, such as her use of
disclaimers, in using Playboy's marks to promote her modeling career."'
The district court also found Welles' willingness to make many changes
in her Web page at Playboy's demand in order to avoid litigation as
further evidence of good faith. 5 8  Finally, the court noted, "the
unavailability of other phrases to accurately describe Ms. Welles and her
business" constituted additional evidence of good faith. 1
59
The Welles court was unwilling to attribute bad faith to Welles based
on Playboy's assertion that she did not ask Playboy's permission to use
the trademarked terms. 6' Rather, the court noted that "[i]f the use is
otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted" by the
owner of the mark.'6' Thus, the court's finding that Welles possessed the
requisite good faith necessary to achieve a successful claim of the fair use
defense was a significant factor in determining liability. "'
The previously discussed cases all involved defendants that purposely
attempted to take advantage of the goodwill and recognition created in a
trademark by the plaintiffs, while Welles only described herself in good
faith to promote her modeling career. Thus, a competitor's intent in
156. See id. ("Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that Ms. Welles has
intended to divert Plaintiff's customers to her website by trading on PEI's goodwill.").
157. See id. at 1080 (noting that Welles clearly took precautions to ensure her use was
fair and approved by Playboy).
158. See id. At Playboy's demand, Welles added disclaimers declaring that her site
was not affiliated with Playboy, included a hyperlink to Playboy's Web site, took out
Playboy's trademarks in some instances, and removed some Playboy images. See id.
159. See id. The Welles court illustrated Welles' lack of descriptive options:
Likewise, given that Ms. Welles is the "Playmate of the Year 1981," there is no
other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her services
without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself as the
"nude model selected by Mr. Hefner's magazine as its number-one prototypical
woman of the year 1981" would be impractical as well as ineffectual in
identifying Terri Welles to the public.
Id. at 1079.
160. See id. at 1080 (rejecting Playboy's argument that a request for permission to use
another's trademark is a factor necessary to determine fair use).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1073-74 (holding that a fair use of another's trademark precludes
liability and that good faith is a significant element of the fair use defense).
163. Compare Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 ("Contrary to Plaintiff's unsupported
allegations of bad faith, Ms. Welles provides uncontroverted evidence that she sought to
take precautions to ensure that her use of PEI's trademarked terms in her website was
permitted by PEI."), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998
WL 724000, at *9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) ("The magistrate judge concludes that the
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using a plaintiff's trademark in its meta tags is a crucial factor not only in
finding liability, but also in allowing the use of the fair use defense.'64
b. Likelihood of Confusion On the Basis of Initial Interest Confusion
As with many claims of trademark infringement and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act, a significant factor to determine
liability in meta tag disputes is the likelihood of consumer confusion,
regardless of the availability of the fair use defense.'65 However, the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield held that initial interest confusion, rather
than the traditional likelihood of confusion, was a more appropriate
standard for trademark violation claims based on meta tag usage.'66
The Welles court applied the initial interest confusion standard set
forth in Brookfield.'67 However, Welles' outcome was different than that
of Brookfield, because Welles' claim of fair use distinguished the two
cases in the application of initial interest confusion.' 8 The Welles court
willful infringement embodied in the offending websites themselves is sufficiently broad,
extensive, blatant, and willful to warrant award of the maximum statutory amount of
$1,000,000.").
164. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073-74. This analysis follows the policy underlying
trademark law. Those who own trademarks do so because they have, through the
expenditure of both effort and money, elevated the mark's status to that of a symbol of
goodwill and recognition among consumers. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra
note 16, at § 2:4 ("An important purpose underlying trademark law is the protection of the
trademark owner's investment in the quality of the mark and the quality of goods."). To
allow another company to use that mark to its advantage in the marketplace without
expending the same effort and money would go against the principles of trad emark law:
In developing the law of unfair competition and trademark infringement, the
courts have taken a logical approach. There is a strong desire to protect the
rights of the first user of the mark. This arises from a sense of basic fairness,
more than from any particular concept of property law. After all, the first user
recognized the value of the mark and went through the effort necessary to
establish the mark as a meaningful symbol. To allow others to usurp that mark
and gain from the first user's efforts is unjust.
Id. at § 2:9 (quoting from Jewel Cos. v. Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Ohio 1976)).
165. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 ("[T]he court must nevertheless address the
issue of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the keystone of whether a use
constitutes trademark infringement or unfair competition.").
166. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1062 n.24 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the traditional eight-factor test was inappropriate);
see also Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 ("This particular difficulty was acknowledged by the
Brookfield court, wherein that court noted that 'the traditional eight-factor test is not well-
suited for analyzing the metatags issue."').
167. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-96.
168. See id. at 1093 ("In other words, Brookfield is distinguishable from the present
case since here both the (1) fair use defense; and (2) the use of trademarks in the metatags
are involved, a situation which is unlike the scenario before the Brookfield court.").
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set forth three factors to determine initial interest confusion, including
"(1) evidence of the initial interest confusion being 'damaging
and wrongful,' (2) evidence that confusion between two
products 'will mistakenly lead the consumer to believe there is
some connection between the two and therefore develop an
interest in the [defendant's] line that it would otherwise not
have,' or (3) evidence that the 'situation offers an opportunity
for sale not otherwise available by enabling defendant to
interest prospective customers by confusion with the plaintiffs
product."",,
69
The Welles court determined that none of these factors were present in
the case, but further noted the lack of evidence to establish culpable
intent on the part of Welles as a reason to decline to declare trademark
infringement and uphold the use of the fair use defense. 170
In declining to find neither initial interest confusion nor bad faith
intent by Welles, the court determined that Welles' use of Playboy's
trademarks in her meta tags constituted fair use.'7 ' Thus, the most
significant factors to determine trademark infringement and unfair
competition in the meta tag context continue to be (1) whether or not the
use is likely to cause initial interest confusion, and (2) whether or not the
use is done with the intent of diverting potential customers from a
competitor's Web site.'
72
2. Trademark Dilution in a Meta Tag Context
In addition to claims of trademark infringement and unfair
competition, claims of trademark dilution are also at issue in the meta
tag context. 73  Dilution occurs when a company uses another's
169. Id. at 1094 (internal citations omitted).
170. See id. at 1094-95.
171. See id. at 1095-96. The court concluded that:
Furthermore, in light of the fact that there is not evidence of an intent by Ms.
Welles to trade upon the goodwill of Plaintiff's marks by falsely implying
sponsorship or affiliation with PEI, and there is no evidence of actual consumer
confusion or likelihood of confusion regarding any implied PEI endorsement,
and in light of the court's discussion ... regarding Ms. Welles' nominative, fair
use of the terms to describe her goods and services, the court holds that Plaintiff
has failed to raise a material issue of fact concerning the fair use of PEI terms in
her metatags.
Id.
172. See supra Part II(A)(1)(a) and (b) and accompanying notes (discussing and
analyzing the importance of initial interest confusion and the defendants' intent to claims
of trademark violations for the wrongful use of meta tags).
173. See Welles, 78 F. Stipp. 2d at 1096 (holding that no trademark dilution occurred);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 WL 724000, at *7-*8
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trademark in a way that reduces the mark's ability to distinguish the
product it represents from other products. 174 Dilution may occur through
either blurring or tarnishment.1
75
The AsiaFocus court specifically held that the defendant's use of
Playboy's trademarks in its meta tags rose to the level of intentional and
willful blurring, resulting in the dilution of Playboy's trademarks. 76
Dilution through tarnishment may occur in the meta tag context where
the Web site or the product on the Web site is of a lower quality than the
Web site or product of the true owner of the trademark. 77 If the public
begins to associate the wrongful user's lower quality Web site or product
with that of the true owner, tarnishment may result, reducing consumers'
perception of the quality of the mark and its associated products. 1
78
(E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (holding that trademark dilution occurred).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998). Dilution is defined in § 1127:
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of-
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
Id.
175. See Franklin Res., Inc. v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 322, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that a showing of either blurring or tarnishment is sufficient to
prove a likelihood of dilution). Recall that blurring occurs where the mark is used by
another on dissimilar products, lessening the mark's value, and tarnishment occurs where
another links the mark with unrelated products that are of reduced quality or image,
causing the public to associate the plaintiffs product with the lower quality product or
image. See supra nn. 42-45 and accompanying text.
176. See AsiaFocus, 1.998 WL 724000, at *7-*8. The court noted that:
The defendants' willfulness is further established by their purposeful tactic of
embedding the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden
computer source code. This strategy epitomizes the "blurring" of PEI's
trademarks. When a search engine led a consumer to the asian-playmates Web
site in response to a search of PEI's trademarks, the consumer would probably
believe that the defendants' Web site was affiliated with PEI.
Id. at *8. The Welles court, however, found no trademark dilution. See Welles, 78 F. Supp.
2d at 1096 (holding that there can be no trademark dilution where there is a fair use of the
trademarked terms).
177. See New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs.,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), stating:
[T]he trademark's reputation and commercial value might be diminished because
the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's
goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods.., or... reduces the trademark's
reputation... in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome identifier of the owner's
products or service.
178. See id.
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B. Advertising Injury Provisions and Trademark Violation Claims: The
Law Remains Unsettled
There are two distinct approaches used to determine whether the
Advertising Injury provisions of CGL policies cover trademark law
violations.'79 The Sixth Circuit has held that policy verbiage must be
strictly construed, such that trademark infringement coverage only exists
when coverage is expressly provided for in the CGL Policy. 8 °
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit advocated a look beyond the language
approach where factors beyond the language of the policy can be
determinative.' These holdings illustrate that the law remains unsettled
as to whether or not standard Advertising Injury provisions of
commercial insurance policies cover trademark violations.'
82
1. The Sixth Circuit's Facial Language Approach
The approach employed by the Sixth Circuit requires a strict
interpretation of policy language.'83 This facial language approach
dictates that no trademark infringement coverage exists where there is
no express mention of trademark infringement in the Advertising Injury
provision of a CGL policy.'8 4 The Sixth Circuit in ShoLodge, Inc. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.,18' held that the provisions "misappropriation of
179. Compare ShoLodge v. Travelers Indem. Co., 168 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1999)
(following a strict facial language approach in considering whether or not CGL insurance
policies cover claims of trademark infringement), with Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Power
Lift, Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602 (9th Cir. June 22, 1998)
(following an approach that looks beyond the facial language of CGL insurance policies to
determine whether such policies cover claims of trademark infringement).
180. See ShoLodge, 168 F.3d at 259.
181. See Power Lift, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *3-4.
182. Compare Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co, 99 F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that trademark and trade dress infringement are not covered under
"'misappropriation of advertising ideas and style of doing business'), and Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 528 N.W.2d 486, 490 (Wis. 1995) (concluding that
misappropriation of style of doing business is not the same as trademark violations), with
Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (stating
that trademark infringement constitutes misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business), and Poof Toy Prods., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 891 F. Supp.
1228, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that trademark infringement is included under
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business").
183. See ShoLodge, 168 F.3d at 259-60.
184. See id. at 260 (stating that "[i]t is unreasonable to think that the insurers would
have enumerated all of the other covered offenses, such as copyright, which are listed in
the definition of 'advertising injury,' but chosen not to list the commonly recognized
offense of trademark infringement").
185. 168 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1999).
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advertising ideas or style of doing business" and "infringement of
copyright, title, or slogan" are not ambiguous and do not cover
trademark violations.'86 The court in ShoLodge applied ordinary
meaning to the words "copyright, title, or slogan" to determine that no
coverage existed.'87 The court concluded that the general language of
Advertising Injury provisions did not cover trademark infringement.'88
The court reasoned that if the insurer planned to cover the insured for
trademark violations, it would have expressly included such language in
the policy, as it included copyright violations.'89
2. The Ninth Circuit's Look Beyond the Language Approach
The second approach, employed by the Ninth Circuit, looks beyond
the language of the policy to determine whether coverage for trademark
law violations exists.' 90 The Ninth Circuit in Federated Mutual Insurance
186. See id. at 259-60 (finding that because the language was not ambiguous the court
must apply ordinary meaning in interpreting the language).
187. See id. While ambiguities in insurance policies are to be construed in favor of the
insured, where there is no ambiguity, terms in an insurance policy are given their ordinary
meaning, favoring neither party. See id. First, the Sixth Circuit held that trademark
infringement could not fall under "infringement of copyright" because trademarks are not
copyrightable. See id. at 259. Second, the court held that it is not covered by
"infringement of slogan" because under ordinary meaning a trademark is not a slogan.
See id. Finally, the court determined that "title" refers only to the non-copyrightable title
of a book, film, or other literary or artistic work. See id. (citing to Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The court further supported this position by noting that its interpretation of the word
"title" in this case directly relates the word to copyright law. See id. at 259-60 ("The
infringement of the title of an artistic work, which is generally too short to be copyrighted,
is directly related to the infringement of copyright law.").
188. See id. at 260.
189. See id. The court stated that:
It is unreasonable to think that the insurers would have enumerated all of the
other covered offenses, such as copyright, which are listed in the definition of
"Advertising Injury," but chosen not to list the commonly recognized offense of
trademark infringement, instead of incorporating that offense under the language
"infringement of copyright, title, or slogan," which by its ordinary meaning does
not include trademark infringement.
Id. The ShoLodge court based its finding that "'misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business"' did not cover trademark infringement the holding in Advance
Watch. See id. at 259 (citing Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795,
802 (6th Cir. 1996)). In Advance Watch, the court held that the language did not include
the category of actionable conduct including trademark infringement. See Advance
Watch, 99 F.3d at 802.
190. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Power Lift, Nos. 97-55242, 97-55254, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13602, at *2 (9th Cir. June 22, 1998) (holding that trademark infringement is
covered under a CGL insurance policy even though the language of the policy did not
specifically include trademark infringement).
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Co. v. Power Lift"' held that the phrase "misappropriation of advertising
ideas or style of doing business" in Advertising Injury provisions
included coverage for trademark violations.
19 2
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision in ShoLodge, the Ninth Circuit
advocated an approach that looks beyond the policy language and
unequivocally holds that under California Law, the phrase
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" does
cover trademark violations.'93 Even though many CGL policies do not
cover intentional acts, Power Lift held that coverage for trademark
infringement exists even when the complaint alleges only intentional or
willful trademark infringement. 94  Thus, under California law, even
defendants such as AsiaFocus, who use another's trademark in its meta
tags in an obvious attempt to divert or confuse consumers, may be
covered by Advertising Injury provisions.' 95
191. Nos. 97-55242,97-55254,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602 (9th Cir. June 22,1998).
192. See id. at *2 (reversing the district court's determination that plaintiff's
Advertising Injury provision did not apply to trademark law violations).
193. See id. at *2-*3. The Ninth Circuit based this determination on Lebas Fashion
Imports of USA v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 41-47 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). In Lebas, the California Court of Appeal determined that trademark violations are
covered by Advertising Injury provisions. See Lebas, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47. The Lebas
court held this way despite the existence of Ninth Circuit precedent holding that
trademarks are not protected by California's common law doctrine of misappropriation.
See Toho Co., v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra
note 19 and accompanying text (noting that meta tag cases often involve claims of
trademark infringement).
194. See Power Lift, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *4. The court reasoned that
although a complaint may allege intentional wrongdoing, the claim may still be covered
since the plaintiff may ultimately only prove negligence or unknowing infringement. See
id. In theory, this holding is contrary to the general principle of insurance law that says
that one looks to the complaint together with the insurance policy in determining
coverage. See AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW, supra note 70, at 23; Maxtech Holding, Inc.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 98-56729, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 12,1999)
(applying California law); Assurance Co. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., No. 95-2384; 96-1010/96-
1027, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34565, at *8 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1997) (applying Mvichigan law).
If a complaint alleges nothing but willful infringement, the court should rule that the
policy's intentional acts exclusion precludes coverage since the plaintiff alleges only
intentional acts. In practice, however, a plaintiff would be ill-advised to specifically allege
only willful infringement since intentional wrongdoing is not necessary for a claim of
trademark infringement and alleging only intentional wrongdoing runs the risk of bringing
the claim outside of the defendant's insurance coverage.
195. See Power Lift, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13602, at *5 (holding that California law
does not preclude insurance coverage for claims of intentional trademark violations).
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III. BUSINESSES WITH HEAVY INTERNET ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE
POLICY COVERAGE
A. Clinching Fair Use: Disclaimers And Permission
The Brookfield'96 court held that using another's trademark in a Web
site's meta tags may constitute trademark law violations, while the
Welles'97 court concluded that such meta tag use may be acceptable when
it constitutes a fair use.' 98 Therefore, businesses that advertise on the
Internet and want to include others' trademarks in their meta tags must
consider the good faith requirements of fair use enunciated by the Welles
court.1 99
Web sites that employ others' trademarks in describing the site may
want to include a disclaimer similar to the one used by Welles.200  A
disclaimer can provide evidence of good faith and also decrease the
likelihood of confusion by the consumer.2° 1 If a Web site contains a
disclaimer that clearly states that the site is not affiliated with companies
holding those trademarked terms, a court is less likely to find consumer
e • 202
confusion. Though a disclaimer may not cure the threat of initial
interest confusion, the disclaimer, in bolstering a claim of good faith, will
help support a fair use defense.
As an additional precaution, a business may ask permission before
using a company's trademark, since a denial of permission will not weigh
196. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 1999).
197. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
198. Compare Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065 (concluding that the Lanham Act prohibits
the use of another company's trademark in a way that is confusingly similar to the
trademark owner's use), with Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (holding that Playboy failed to
raise a material issue of fact of the fair use issue).
199. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. The steps taken by Welles included adding a
disclaimer clearly indicating Welles' Web site was not affiliated with Playboy, including a
link from Welles' site to Playboy's Web site, and the substitution or removal of certain
images or words to which Playboy had objected. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Consumers Union v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1.053 (2d Cir. 1983)
(noting that disclaimers may be effective in eliminating consumer confusion).
202. See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1093, noting that:
[E]ven if a web user clicks on the website belonging to the defendant, he will see
that the domain name of the website he has selected is the defendant's domain
name... . Consequently, the Brookfield court concluded that in the context of
metatags, it is "difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be confused about
whose site he has reached or to think that somehow [the plaintiff] sponsors [the
defendant's] web site."
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against a defendant in any subsequent lawsuit.2 °3 Moreover, courts do
not construe a request for permission as an indication that a defendant
believed permission was necessary to use the trademark.2 °4 Since asking
permission may bolster a defendant's claim of good faith for the
purposes of a fair use defense, while not hurting a defendant's claim of
fair use, under some circumstances it is advisable that a business using
another's trademark in its Web site meta tags first request permission.
B. Advertising Injury Provisions: Clearly Including Trademark
Infringement
Although businesses advertising on the World Wide Web may guard
against claims of trademark violation, the increase in Web advertising
has led to an increase in inappropriate claims of trademark infringement
in connection with that use.2 5  Thus, even though a business may
increase its chances to defend such claims on the basis of fair use, the
issue still remains as to whether those trademark infringement claims will
implicate an insurer's duty to defend its insured. Since the law is
unsettled in this area, it is advisable that businesses vulnerable to such
inappropriate claims ensure that the Advertising Injury provisions of
their policies cover trademark infringement.
For example, the ShoLodge court held that had the insurer in that case
intended to cover trademark infringement, it would have unambiguously
included it in the policy provision, as it had copyright infringement.20 6
Thus, businesses vulnerable to claims of trademark infringement should
request that their policies unambiguously include trademark
infringement. In addition to including "infringement of copyright,"
Advertising Injury provisions should also include "infringement of
trademark." Under this language, a court need not decide whether to
interpret the policy as including trademark infringement under the duty
to defend, because it will be expressly covered by it.
217
203. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n. 18 (1994) (rejecting
the argument that a defendant's request for permission suggests the defendant believed
their use was not a fair one).
204. See id
205. See Oratz, supra note 11 ("In addition to the discovery of actual trademark
infringers, the expansion of the internet is also leading to an expansion of inappropriate
claims of trademark infringement.").
206. See ShoLodge v. Travelers Indem. Co., 168 F.3d 256, 260 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The
only reasonable assumption is that 'if Travelers had intended to provide coverage for such
liability, [they] would have referred to it by name in the policy."') (quoting Advance
Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 803 (6th Cir. 1996)).
207. See id. at 259 ("Where there is no ambiguity, terms should be given their ordinary
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C. Prior Acts Exclusion: Covering All Internet Advertising Time
Businesses must consider prior acts exclusions. Prior acts exclusions
exclude coverage for any acts committed prior to the effective date of the
policy.0 8  Therefore, a business vulnerable to suit must take into
consideration the time at which it began advertising on the Web by using
others' trademarks as meta tags in relation to when its commercial
insurance policy became effective." 9 If the advertising began prior to the
effective date of the policy, the insurer may deny coverage based on a
prior acts exclusion, leaving the insured to defend on its own.21° Armed
with this information, a business may request that its CGL policy include
a clause that retroactively applies the Advertising Injury provision to
ongoing advertising that commenced prior to the policy's effective date.
D. Web Insurance Policy: Accounting for the Meta Tag Issue
Finally, insurance companies are not unresponsive to the complex
issues that arise when an entity conducts business on the Web.21 ' For
example, the Chubb Group insurance company has created a
"Multimedia Liability Insurance" policy.21 2 These policies often serve as
a supplement to CGL policies.213 Multimedia policies are specifically
meaning, and neither party ought to be favored.") (citing In re Estate of Clement, 220
Tenn. 114 (Tenn. 1967).
208. See AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW, supra note 70, at 497; Maxtech Holding, Inc. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., No. 98-56729, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *5-*6 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999)
(noting that a prior acts exclusion excludes from coverage activity beginning before the
effective date of the policy).
209. See Maxtech, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29978, at *6.
210. See id.
211. See Adam H. Fleischer, Internet Torts and Cyberspace Insurance. New Issues for
the E-Conomy, 88 ILL. B.J. 268, 274 (2000) ("Over 40 new insurance products attempt to
address the needs of Internet and technology companies either by packaging various types
of coverage or including a broad range of coverage in one policy."). The many available
policies vary in nature, some cover only third party claims, while others are offensive in
nature because they cover legal expenses incurred by a business for bringing a suit to stop
trademark infringement committed by another. See id.
212. See Paar, supra note 2, at 1114 (noting that the policy covers publishing claims).
Several other insurance companies provide similar policies, such as INSUREtrust (writing
an "Errors and Omissions Policy" to protect against third-party claims) and Lloyd's of
London (providing a Website and Internet Security Program which may be expanded to
include trademark infringement). See id at 1113-14.
213. See id. However, businesses with supplemental policies must take caution.
Multiple policies may require payment of unnecessary premiums. See id. Multiple
policies may also incite litigation where more than one policy applies. See id. Further,
when a business has separate policies to contend with, gaps in coverage may be created,
especially where the policies derive from different carriers. See id.
1042 [Vol. 50:1009
Meta Tag Trademark Infringement
tailored to those companies that do business on the Web.1 4
Advantages to coverage under such a policy are evident. Since it is
specially tailored to the needs of Web advertisers, the policy may remedy
many of the problems associated with applying existing law and policy to
the new and untested realm of Internet law.2"5  The problems are
lessened because rather than attempting to cover business risks on the
Internet through insurance policies that were written without
contemplating such risks, a. multimedia policy specifically provides
coverage for those risks in the Internet context.21 6 However, as with the
purchase of any insurance policy, a business must study several potential
policies before purchasing one because not all multimedia policies cover
intellectual property claims such as trademark infringement.217
IV. CONCLUSION
Case law indicates that both intent and likelihood of confusion,
specifically in the form of initial interest confusion, are factors in disputes
concerning the use of a third party's trademark in Web site meta tags.
Because the potential for inappropriate claims of trademark
infringement on the World Wide Web is increasing, it is important for
Web advertisers to understand that the law is currently unsettled in
determining whether the language of a CGL policy's Advertising Injury
clause covers trademark infringement. To insulate themselves from
responsibility for large defense fees and judgments, businesses should
work with their insurance carriers to develop policy language that will
ensure coverage for potential trademark infringement claims.
214. See id. at 1112-13 (noting that the specialized coverages are designed to insure
Internet claims).
215. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining the novelty of the Internet).
216. See supra notes 211-12.
217. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 274 (noting some policies that are designed for
Internet activities but do not cover trademark infringement claims); Paar, supra note 2, at
1113-14 (noting several specially tailored policies that do not list trademark infringement
or intellectual property claims as covered).
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